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I. INTRODUCTION 
Kenworth filed its Appellant's Brief on 6/21/18. The Skinners subsequently filed their 
Respondents ' Brief on 7 /18/18 and Kenworth submits the following reply to the arguments 
contained therein. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Its Approach to the First Element of a Prima 
Facie Unjust Enrichment Claim. 
In its Appellant's Brief, Kenworth argues that the trial court erred in its application of the 
first element of an unjust enrichment claim. Kenw01ih pointed out that a benefit is considered 
conferred, not just when one "satisfies the debt of another," but also when one "gives the other 
some interest in money, land, or possessions, performs services beneficial to or at the request of 
the other. .. or in any other way adds to the other's advantage." Med. Recovery Services, LLC v. 
Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395,398,336 P.3d 802, 805 (2014). The trial 
court determined that with regard to Kenworth's decision to pay off the residual amounts owing 
under the lease, no debt was satisfied, and that therefore no benefit was conferred, completely 
ignoring the remainder of the language from Med. Recovery Services.1 
In their Respondents' Brief, the Skinners double down on that error, refusing to address the 
remainder of the Med. Recovery Services test and claiming that "It is true that there was no debt to 
satisfy, which does cause the first prong to fail." Respondent's Brief, p. 5. Again, although 
1 Kenworth also argues that the trial court erred in finding that no debt was satisfied, but that argument will not be 
re-addressed here. 
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Kenworth asserts that a debt was satisfied, this conclusion ignores the fact that Kenworth both (1) 
performed a service beneficial to the Respondents and (2) added to their advantage. As such, the 
trial court's limited analysis of the first prong of Kenworth's prima facie unjust enrichment claim 
was error. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Considered and Applied the Unpled "Officious 
Intermeddler" Affirmative Defense. 
The Skinners, in their Respondents' Brief, accuse Kenworth of misleading the Court and 
making up law because "[n]o cases discuss the requirement that the [officious intermeddler] 
doctrine be pied as an affirmative defense." Respondents' Brief, p. 8. However, Kenworth has 
been clear in its position that, although Idaho caselaw has never explicitly stated that the officious 
intermeddler defense is an affirmative defense, it is an affirmative defense and has been treated as 
such by Idaho's courts.2 See Appellant's Brief, p. 9. That position remains true for the reasons 
stated in Kenw01ih's prior brief and for the reasons contained therein, Kenworth simply requests 
that this Court so hold. 
The Skinners also argue that the officious intermeddler doctrine need not be affirmatively 
pied or be waived because "I.R.C.P. 8(c)(l) lists the defenses that must be pied affirmatively, and 
the list does not include the officious intermeddler doctrine." Respondents' Brief, p. 8. But, the 
list contained in Rule 8(c)(l) is not exhaustive.3 Garren v. Butigan, 95 Idaho 355, 358, 509 P.2d 
340, 343 (1973) ("Although I.R.C.P. 8(c) enumerates nineteen affirmative defenses, the listing is 
not intended to be exhaustive or exclusive."). As mentioned in Kenworth's Appellant's Brief, an 
affirmative defense is one in which "the defendant has the burden of introducing evidence and 
2 One of the purposes ofan appeal is to have certain areas of the law, heretofore unaddressed, clarified. 
3 Rule 8(c)(l) reads "In Responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative 
defense, including: ... " (emphasis added). Nowhere does the Rule limit itself to the affirmative defenses listed 
therein. 
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persuading the finder of fact. .. which the Plaintiff may defeat by the introduction of evidence of 
his own." Appellant's Brief, p. 10 (citing to Williams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 163,559 P.2d 1123, 
1131, n.l ( 1976)). Based on the following statement from the Respondents Brief, this is exactly 
how the defense was treated by defense counsel at trial : 
Finally, in order to ensure that the officious intermeddler doctrine applied, 
Skinner's counsel had to confirm at trial with each of Kenworth's witnesses that 
there was no agreement made with Skinner. Once it was confirmed that there was 
no agreement, then Skinner's counsel was able to conclusively find that the 
officious intermeddler doctrine did apply. Once Kenworth rested his case, and both 
parties were preparing for their closing briefs, Skinner's counsel was able to apply 
the doctrine in full. Based on these facts, raising the doctrine earlier in the case 
would have been impossible for Skinner. 
Respondents ' Brief, p. 8 
Ignoring the fact that such a statement contradicts a prior statement made by defense 
counsel to Judge Shindurling, on the record, that he didn't even discover the doctrine until 
researching for his closing brief after trial,4 the scenario described fits the Paxton language 
regarding affirmative defenses exactly. The Respondents argue that they sought to elicit certain 
evidence at trial ( e.g., that there was no agreement) that they thought would establish the defense, 
allowing them to argue it in their closing brief, but that they couldn't be sure until after trial. 5 The 
problem is, in failing to raise it in pleadings before trial or even to move to amend at the close of 
evidence, they failed to put Kenworth on notice as required by I.R.C.P. 8 or to give Kenworth any 
chance to respond. Therefore, the defense was waived and its application by the trial court was 
error. 
4 Supp. Tr. 6:4-7 ("And I didn't find the cases on officious intermeddler until I was doing my written closing 
argument. But somehow on my mind it was-there was no agreement."). 
5 The Respondents' assertion that raising the doctrine earlier (i.e. either before or during trial) was impossible is 
makes absolutely no sense. Defenses are routinely pied on the chance that they may potentially apply at trial. 
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Additionally, the Respondents' argue that Kenworth's reason for conferring a benefit on 
the Skinners is invalid based on Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 941 P.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1997). 
That argument is inapposite, as the facts in Becker and the those involved here couldn't be further 
apart. 
The Becker Court denied an unjust enrichment claim on the basis of unclean hands, as 
plaintiff in that case, who was obligated under an agreement with the city to acquire notarized 
authorization from property owners before acting on their behalf, failed to do so. The issue of the 
officious intermeddler doctrine was only discussed in a concurring opinion, and even then, that 
concurrence relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiff not only failed to get the defendants' 
consent before beginning work, the defendants objected to the work, requested that the plaintiff 
cease all work through their attorney, and even tried to barricade their property to keep the plaintiff 
out. Id. at 385, 941 P.2d at 357. Becker does not stand for the proposition, as the Respondents 
assert, that a valid reason for conferring a benefit cannot exist where consent has not been given 
and where the party conferring the benefit also stands to benefit therefrom. 
The Respondents admit that Kenworth acted for the purpose of keeping the Skinners in 
business. Respondents' Brief, p. 9. That purpose is valid, despite the Skinners' lack of express 
consent.6 Therefore, even if the officious intermeddler defense was not waived, the trial court 
erred by recognizing and then subsequently ignoring Kenworth's valid reason for taking the action 
that it did.7 
6 The trial court recognized this reason but then overlooked it in its analysis. R. 193 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law). 
7 Again, the trial court recognized that an individual is not an intermeddler "if such a person has a valid reason for 
conferring the benefit, such as protecting an interest," but then cursorily determined that because there "was no 
testimony that Kenworth had an interest in the trucks," Kenworth was an officious intermeddler. R. 190-191, 193 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). It was as if the trial court read the language from Curtis so as to limit 
valid reasons for intermeddling to situations wherein an interest is being protected. Such is simply not the case. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, as well as those provided in prior briefing in this appeal, the 
Appellant respectfully requests the relief sought in its Appellant's Brief. 
DATED this 6111 day of August, 2018. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
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